Systematic failure to perform exclusion (making a response that opposes the participant's natural inclinations) for brieXy displayed, masked words has been interpreted as evidence of unconscious perception. The present study required participants to make a forcedchoice exclusion after viewing masked word targets. The forced-choice exclusion task was properly performed in all experiments, in contrast to previous studies that have utilized stem-completion as a dependent variable. The exclusion failure eVects interpreted as unconscious perception in earlier studies appear to be caused by an insensitive dependent variable (stem-completion) rather than unconscious perception.
Introduction
The characterization of the conscious and unconscious elements of perception has been a long-standing goal of psychological research, dating back to the late 1800s (Sidis, 1898) . Most investigators would agree that unconscious processes play an important role in perception. There is little consensus, however, regarding how the unconscious components of perception can be isolated from conscious experience and studied in pure form (for recent reviews, see Erdelyi, 2004; Holender & Duscherer, 2004; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001; Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004) . The lack of consensus may be partly due to the methodology used to study unconscious perception. Typically, the classic dissociation paradigm is used. The goal of this approach is to Wnd evidence of perceptual sensitivity occurring in the absence of awareness. Dissociations between perceptual sensitivity and awareness are diYcult to interpret, because such Wndings could reasonably be attributed to conscious perception accompanied by a conservative decision criterion (Fisk & Haase, 2005; Haase & Fisk, 2001; Snodgrass, 2002) .
The exclusion task from the process dissociation paradigm has been advocated for overcoming the limitations of the classic dissociation approach (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997; Merikle & Joordens, 1997a; Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995) . In an exclusion task, consciously perceived information must be intentionally used to respond in a way that does not match the displayed target. For example, a brieXy displayed, masked word stimulus might be presented, followed by a stem-completion task in which the participant is asked to create a word from the stem that does not match the displayed target word (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Merikle et al., 1995) . If the target was consciously perceived, the participant generates a word that does not match the target. Unconsciously perceived information, however, cannot be excluded because it is unavailable to conscious decision processes. The displayed stimulus might, nonetheless, inXuence responding through an automatic mechanism (Forster, Booker, Schacter, & Davis, 1990) , thereby producing exclusion failure (i.e., completing the stem with the displayed target word contrary to instructions). Findings of elevated exclusion failure at short target durations have thus been interpreted as evidence of unconscious perception (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Merikle et al., 1995) . According to advocates of the exclusion approach, the primary advantage is that the conscious or unconscious status of a percept can be determined without the need to establish null awareness (Merikle & Joordens, 1997a) . The popularity of the exclusion approach is increasing, with recent studies employing this methodology to study unconscious perception in clinical populations (Esterman et al., 2002) , hemispheric diVerences in perception (Fecteau, Kingstone, & Enns, 2004; Smith & Bulman-Fleming, 2004) , attentional blink (Visser, Merikle, & DiLollo, 2005) , repetition priming (Matsumoto, Iidaka, Nomura, & Ohira, 2005) , and the lexical status of priming eVects (Hutchison, Neely, Neill, & Walker, 2004) .
Although the exclusion task has advantages over the classic dissociation approach, a number of studies question the validity of this procedure for distinguishing between the conscious and unconscious components of perception. Visser and Merikle (1999) report that exclusion failure eVects suggestive of unconscious perception can be eliminated by giving the participants a monetary incentive for correct performance. In their study, the motivated group showed exclusion success with 50 ms masked targets; these results contradict previous studies that showed exclusion failure with similar stimuli and display parameters. The Wndings from this study could be interpreted in several ways. Perhaps the participants in the motivated group allocated more attention to the task, which permitted them to consciously perceive the targets on more trials and thus achieve successful exclusion (Merikle & Joordens, 1997b) . Visser and Merikle's results can also be conceptualized as a manipulation of decision criteria. According to Snodgrass (2002) , the monetary incentive provided by Visser and Merikle encouraged a more liberal identiWcation decision criterion and thereby eliminated exclusion failure eVects. Essentially, the participants were more willing to consciously acknowledge Xeeting perceptions of the "noisy" target word when they had a Wnancial incentive. If this interpretation is correct, exclusion failure eVects are the product of a conservative decision criterion rather than unconscious perception. These interpretations suggest that the stimuli used in previous reports of exclusion failure can be consciously perceived, thereby raising questions about whether the Wndings of exclusion failure in previous studies should be interpreted as solely unconscious.
A number of other studies performed after Visser and Merikle (1999) have also raised questions about the validity of exclusion-based approaches to the study of unconscious perception. Exclusion failure can be obtained at relatively long target durations that are likely to have a signiWcant degree of conscious perception (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Fecteau et al., 2004; Fisk & Haase, in press ). In fact, it is sometimes diYcult to demonstrate that exclusion instructions are properly performed at long target durations (Fisk & Haase, in press ). Furthermore, exclusion failure is typically accompanied by moderately high levels of word vs. nonword discrimination sensitivity (Fisk & Haase, in press) . As a result, exclusion failure eVects do not occur when the participants are incapable of reporting the target stimulus (Bengson, 2005) . These Wndings support the interpretation that exclusion failure eVects should be considered subjective threshold phenomena that would, at best, provide only weak evidence of unconscious perception (Snodgrass, 2002) .
Additional evidence that raises questions the unconscious status of exclusion failure is that exclusion failure does not consistently occur for all stimulus items. Fisk and Haase (in press, Experiment 3) found that most word targets do not produce exclusion failure, but a small number of word-word stem combinations consistently produced high levels of exclusion failure. A similar result has been obtained by Bengson (2005) , who found that exclusion failure eVects occur when results are aggregated by stimulus items, rather than by participant. These Wndings raise the possibility that exclusion failure eVects may be an experimental artifact.
The present experiments were performed to further evaluate the validity of exclusion methods for the study of unconscious perception. Unlike previous studies employing stem-completion tasks, the present work utilized a constrained exclusion task (two alternative forced choice: 2AFC) as an expression of perceptual processing. This exclusion task required observers to pick the word in a 2AFC exclusion that was not the presented target word on each trial. For example, observers were shown a target word stimulus (e.g., "PLACE"), then asked to choose the opposite stimulus in a forced-choice exclusion task (e.g., choosing the word "NIGHT" instead of "PLACE" when given a choice between "NIGHT" and "PLACE"). Exclusion performance was examined at diVerent levels of discrimination (word vs. nonword) conWdence. The primary goal was to reveal qualitative patterns of responding that might provide evidence of conscious or unconscious perception in exclusion paradigms.
Methods

Participants
The participants were 84 undergraduate students from Georgia Southwestern State University. The participants were assigned to one of four experiments that had diVerent target durations and discrimination task conditions (see below). The students received extra credit in their Introductory Psychology class for their participation. All participants spoke English as their native language and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Materials and apparatus
The visual stimuli were controlled with the Micro Experimental Laboratory software application (MEL; version 2.0 for MS-DOS; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) running on an American Megatrends computer (Intel 486sx microprocessor, 25 MHz). The word stimuli were Wve-letter English words obtained from word frequency norms (Kucera & Francis, 1967) . The 64 words used in the experiment were divided into 32 pairs. The word pairings were made to control for word frequency eVects (i.e., targets and distractors had a similar frequency) and order eVects. The eight nonwords from the noise trials (see below) and the eight masking stimuli (see below) were composed of Wve-letter strings of random letters that did not resemble an English word or the target stimuli.
In all experiments, the target stimuli were words (50% of all trials) or nonwords (50% of all trials) presented for either 43 ms (two experiments) or 57 ms (two experiments). The targets were presented between 500 ms forward and backward masks of randomly selected letters. These display parameters were chosen to be similar to previous studies reporting exclusion failure eVects (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Merikle et al., 1995; Visser & Merikle, 1999) .
Experimental protocol
In the Wrst set of experiments, the participants received either 43 ms targets (N D 20) or 57 ms targets (N D 20). Each stimulus presentation was followed by a word-nonword discrimination task on a rating scale of one to six, with higher ratings indicating increasing conWdence that a word target was presented. As in previous studies, the word choices from the 2AFC exclusion task were made available to the participants during the word discrimination task (Haase & Fisk, 2001; Merikle & Reingold, 1990) . Next, the participants were required to make an exclusion response in a 2AFC task. The target word and the corresponding distractor were shown side by side during the exclusion phase of each trial. Observers were instructed to choose the word in the word pair that was not the presented target, thereby creating an exclusion task (see Table 1 ). The exclusion task was performed on all trials, regardless of whether a word or nonword target was displayed. The trials were divided into Wve blocks with 64 trials in each block, with time for a break between each block.
The second set of experiments was the same as the Wrst set except that the discrimination task was modiWed so that the target and distractor words were not available to the participants during the discrimination task. This was done to avoid any priming from the discrimination task to the subsequent forced-choice task, thus keeping the two tasks more separated than in the Wrst set of experiments. Otherwise, the tasks and other experimental parameters were the same as in the Wrst set of experiments. In these two experiments, 22 participants received 43 ms targets and 22 participants received 57 ms targets.
Data analysis
Summary data were generated using the "analyze" program of the MEL software package. All accuracy data from the exclusion experiments were expressed as the proportion of exclusion errors (i.e., choosing the same word as the target on the exclusion task despite instructions to choose the distractor word) to facilitate comparisons to previous studies using stem completion tasks. The mean proportion of exclusion errors on signal + noise trials was expressed as a function of discrimination conWdence ratings to determine if exclusion was diVerent from random at low conWdence ratings. In the 2AFC exclusion task, exclusion errors at 0.50 is random performance. Exclusion performance signiWcantly below 0.50 (i.e., a reduction in exclusion errors or proper performance of the exclusion task) is exclusion success, whereas exclusion performance signiWcantly above 0.50 (i.e., an increase in exclusion errors) is exclusion failure.
The descriptive and inferential statistics were performed on exclusion data from the discrimination ratings of each participant who had 10 or more trials. Task accuracy as a function of discrimination conWdence ratings was examined for below or above random exclusion performance at the low discrimination conWdence ratings with single sample t-tests. Accordingly, two-tailed cutoVs were used when testing for statistical signiWcance, given that either above random (i.e., exclusion failure) or below random (i.e., exclusion success) performance would be of potential interest.
Discrimination sensitivity was determined with methods based on signal detection theory (Green, Weber, & Duncan, 1977; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) and mean exclusion performance conditional on discrimination category rating. Discrimination sensitivity was expressed as d a , which is similar to the more familiar dЈ except that d a is more appropriate for experiments with a rating scale design, especially when the noise and signal + noise distributions have unequal variances (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) .
Another method for evaluating unconscious perception eVects involves comparing performance from exclusion tasks (i.e., producing a response diVerent from the target) to inclusion tasks (i.e., matching the response to the target). This strategy is used by a number of investigators (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Esterman et al., 2002; Fecteau et al., 2004; Matsumoto et al., 2005; Visser & Merikle, 1999) . The results from the experiments with exclusion choices available during the discrimination task were compared to results from two similar, previously published experiments performed with inclusion instructions (Fisk & Haase, 2005) . The hardware, software, stimuli, display parameters (43 and 57 ms targets), and discrimination task were exactly the same in this previous study, with the only diVerence being that the participants matched the target to the stimulus choices (identiWcation; an inclusion task). The relative proportions of conscious perception and unconscious perception were determined using formulas 3 (C D inclusion ¡ exclusion) and 4 (U D exclusion/(1 ¡ C)) of Debner and Jacoby (1994) . The proportions were calculated for each group, then the proportions of conscious perception and unconscious perception were determined.
Results
The overall mean proportions of exclusion errors on the signal + noise trials from the 57 and 43 ms exclusion experiments with target choices present at discrimination were .21 (SE D .02) and .45 (SE D .01), respectively. The exclusion error rates in both experiments were signiWcantly below random (57 ms: t(19) D ¡11.99, p < .0000000002; 43 ms: t(19) D ¡3.41, p < .003), thereby demonstrating exclusion success. When the 2AFC exclusion task choices were not shown during the discrimination task, the mean overall exclusion error rate was .35 (SE D .05) and .44 (SE D .02) in the 57 and 43 ms experiments, respectively. Both of these results were signiWcantly below random performance (57 ms: t(21) D ¡3.31, p < .003; 43 ms: t(21) D ¡3.13, p < .01). All of the present experiments showed exclusion success (a signiWcant decrease in exclusion errors relative to random performance), a pattern that other investigators have interpreted as evidence of conscious perception.
Exclusion performance from the signal + noise trials was further evaluated by comparison of exclusion errors at each discrimination rating to random performance (0.50). All experiments produced random or signiWcantly below random exclusion errors at every discrimination rating ( Fig. 1 and Table 2 ). The only exception was the "1" rating of the 57 ms experiment with exclusion choices present at discrimination. This result, however, was not signiWcantly diVerent from random (M D .55, SE D .02, t(3) D ¡2.01, p < .14), mostly because very few participants chose the "1" rating in this experiment (Fig. 1A) . In contrast, the 57 ms experiment in which the exclusion choices were not displayed had signiWcantly decreased exclusion errors on word trials at the lowest conWdence rating, which demonstrated exclusion success. Participants in this experiment were apparently able to properly perform the exclusion task even on signal + noise trials in which they had no conWdence in their perception of the target stimulus. In the experiment with 57 ms targets and choices present during the discrimination task, the participants following exclusion instructions made fewer errors (M D .21, SD D .11) than participants who were given inclusion instructions in a previous study (M D .29, SD D .12, t(38) D ¡3.75, p < .0006). In other words, the participants in the exclusion experiment performed better than the group with the inclusion task. Exclusion choices not available during the discrimination task:
Exclusion choices available during the discrimination task: 
Discussion
The present experiments demonstrate that forced choice exclusion tasks consistently produce exclusion success (i.e., proper execution of the exclusion task). Exclusion success was expressed as signiWcant decreases in exclusion errors relative to random performance. On signal + noise trials with low discrimination conWdence, most experiments had random levels of exclusion performance. However, the experiments with longer target durations sometimes produced evidence of exclusion success even when participants lacked conWdence that a target word was displayed. There was no evidence of exclusion failure (i.e., incorrect execution of the exclusion task due to presumably unconscious inXuences). These results show that participants can intentionally and deliberately choose the opposite of a brieXy presented, masked target, which suggests that a suYcient degree of information from the target is consciously perceived to properly perform the exclusion task.
These results are consistent with an earlier study with a forced-choice exclusion task (Haase & Fisk, 2001 ), but they are completely contrary to other studies reporting exclusion failure eVects (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Fecteau et al., 2004; Fisk & Haase, in press; Hutchison et al., 2004; Merikle et al., 1995; Smith & Bulman-Fleming, 2004; Visser et al., 2005) . These contrary results occurred even though the present study utilized display parameters and stimuli that were similar or identical to earlier studies reporting exclusion failure. Perceptual diVerences between studies are, therefore, unlikely to explain the inability to replicate exclusion failure eVects. The discrepancy between studies is most likely the dependent variable, which is invariably stemcompletion tasks in studies reporting exclusion failure eVects. Apparently stem-completion tasks are required for producing exclusion failure eVects. The Wnding that exclusion failure eVects are task-speciWc suggests that the exclusion failure eVects obtained in previous studies could be interpreted as an experimental artifact rather than unconscious perception.
A potential criticism of the current Wndings is that the 2AFC exclusion task used in the present experiments might be insensitive to unconscious perception. The forced-choice task is a direct measure of perception, whereas stem completion is an indirect measure that might have greater sensitivity to unconscious processes. For example, it is possible that 2AFC exclusion could be performed in a way similar to 2AFC identiWcation via perception of simple target stimulus features. This might produce discrepancies between the current Wndings and other studies reporting exclusion failure. Even if this criticism is valid, it must be acknowledged that signiWcant conscious perception of the word stimuli is occurring in the present experiments. By extension, other studies reporting exclusion failure eVects with similar display parameters might also involve conscious perception of word information. In addition, proper performance of the current exclusion task requires participants to deliberately and intentionally choose a word that is diVerent from the presented target. The participants in the experiments with 57 ms targets, for example, are highly accurate on the exclusion task. This degree of exclusion accuracy would only be possible if conscious perception were involved. Altogether, the Wndings suggest that conscious perception is likely under the display parameters used in the present experiments, even though the stimulus settings are similar to previous studies reporting exclusion failure eVects.
Although some investigators might criticize 2AFC exclusion for being insensitive to unconscious perception, it would be equally valid to make the converse interpretation: perhaps exclusion tasks based on stem-completion tasks are simply insensitive to conscious perception. In support of this interpretation, we have found that exclusion experiments with stem-completion tasks sometimes fail to demonstrate evidence of conscious perception such as exclusion success at long stimulus durations (Fisk & Haase, in press ). If exclusion based on stem-completion are less sensitive to conscious perception than 2AFC exclusion, then we would expect that 2AFC exclusion would show much stronger evidence of conscious perception, which is consistent with the outcome of the present experiments. Evidence in support of this viewpoint comes from experiments comparing free report, cued free report, and forced-choice performance of masked word targets (Johnston, 1978 ). Johnston's results showed that correct identiWcation of the target was lowest in the free report condition (.31), intermediate in the cued free report condition (.54 to.55), and highest in the forcedchoice condition (.77 to .80). These Wndings are analogous to the diVerences between exclusion studies based on stem completion, which could be considered a form of cued free report, and the present results based on a forced choice task. One potential explanation for these sensitivity diVerences between stem completion-based and 2AFC-based exclusion is Sophisticated Guessing Theory. This theory proposes that participants perceive some limited degree of information from masked word targets, then use that information to narrow down the possible response possibilities to a small set of reasonable alternatives (Nakatani, 1973; Solomon & Postman, 1952) . In 2AFC exclusion, there are only two possible response alternatives, so even a small amount of consciously perceived stimulus information could potentially guide participant responses. In contrast, there may be many possible completions for a stem (e.g., the stem "SPI__" could be completed as "SPIKE", "SPICE", "SPIRE", "SPIT", etc.). This would make it more diYcult to use any marginal conscious perception of the target to guide responding, thereby leading to lower overall sensitivity to conscious perception. The key point is that stem completion tasks may simply lack sensitivity to conscious perception, thus exclusion failure eVects are more likely to be obtained with stem completion tasks than with 2AFC exclusion.
The possibility that 2AFC exclusion is more sensitive to the eVects of conscious perception than exclusion tasks based upon stem-completion is consistent with the discrimination sensitivity results. All experiments had word-nonword discrimination sensitivity that was signiWcantly above zero, suggesting that the targets were consciously perceived on a substantial proportion of the trials. Given that the present display parameters are similar to those used in previous studies, it is reasonable to assume that the exclusion failure eVects in these earlier studies were accompanied by signiWcant sensitivity to the target stimulus (Fisk & Haase, in press ). This result lends support to Snodgrass' (2002) interpretation of exclusion failure eVects as a subjective threshold paradigm; exclusion success or failure only occurs when participants have signiWcant sensitivity to the target stimuli. The eVects of exclusion failure may thus reXect a shift in the identiWcation criterion (Snodgrass, 2002) . Participants with a conservative criterion might doubt their consciously perceived information, then complete the stem with the target. This failure to perform the exclusion task would, however, make exclusion failure the product of the decision criterion rather than an expression of unconscious perception. Preliminary support for this position has been obtained by Bengson (personal communication) . In summary, the presence of signiWcant discrimination sensitivity raises doubts as to whether Wndings of exclusion failure from previous studies can be unambiguously interpreted as unconscious perception. Debner and Jacoby (1994) , who were the Wrst to use exclusion tasks to study unconscious perception, focused on estimating the relative contributions of conscious and unconscious perception via the process dissociation framework. Application of this logic to the present experiments yielded contradictory results. Exclusion failure eVects suggesting unconscious perception were not obtained in the present experiments, yet the unconscious perception component was estimated at .51 and .42 in two experiments. Furthermore, the U component was larger than the C component in the 43 ms experiment, even though the overall results of the experiment showed exclusion success (i.e., conscious perception). Although this seems paradoxical, similar results have been obtained by other investigators utilizing stem completion tasks. Visser and Merikle (1999) found that motivational incentives produced exclusion success instead of exclusion failure for 50 ms masked word targets, thereby suggesting conscious perception. The magnitude of unconscious perception, however, in the motivated group was estimated to be .22, which was only about .08 lower than the control group that showed exclusion failure eVects (see Fig. 2 of Visser & Merikle, 1999) . It is also noteworthy that the present study yielded larger estimates of unconscious perception than Visser and Merikle (1999) . These estimates were larger than Visser and Merikle (1999) even though the present study had similar display parameters, no exclusion failure eVects, and a forced-choice task instead of stem completion.
The contradictory pattern of these results (exclusion success accompanied by signiWcant estimates of unconscious perception) suggests that the algebraic logic underlying the process dissociation procedure is Xawed. The qualitative diVerence between exclusion performance and baseline performance, such as either exclusion success or exclusion failure, is not considered in the process dissociation calculations. It seems unlikely that the simple algebraic calculations of the process dissociation procedure are accurately estimating the magnitude of unconscious perception given that the results have little relevance to the qualitative nature of exclusion success or exclusion failure.
A closer examination of the mathematical formulas of process dissociation illustrates the nature of the problem. Debner and Jacoby (1994) calculated the conscious component (C) of perception to be C D inclusion ¡ exclusion and the unconscious perception component (U) to be U D exclusion/(1 ¡ C). Participants are likely to make at least a few errors on the exclusion task due to attentional lapses or other factors. These errors would translate into evidence of unconscious perception via the mathematics of process dissociation. Problems arise, however, if exclusion performance is perfect. When this occurs, C D inclusion ¡ 0, and the magnitude of the unconscious component cannot be calculated. Previous studies have addressed this problem by discarding data from participants with perfect exclusion performance. For example, Experiments 1 and 2 of Debner and Jacoby (1994) had a substantial proportion of participants who achieved perfect performance (Experiment 1: 30%; Experiment 2: 25%). The data from these participants were removed to estimate the magnitude of conscious perception and unconscious perception. Other studies have employed similar data elimination strategies when estimating the conscious and unconscious components. Visser and Merikle (1999) did not calculate the proportions of conscious and unconscious perception at long target durations because some participants had perfect performance on the exclusion task. In another study, 10 out of 14 participants had perfect performance on one side of a lateralized display (Esterman et al., 2002) . These investigators estimated the relative contributions of conscious perception and unconscious perception by combining the data from all participants to make a "macro-subject" (p. 242). These examples show that when perfect exclusion performance is obtained, the data are simply dropped when calculating the contributions of conscious and unconscious processing.
The problem of perfect exclusion performance in the process dissociation calculations reveals a disturbing possibility: the calculations are essentially Wxed a priori to provide evidence of unconscious perception. If the participants make exclusion errors, then unconscious perception is occurring. If they do not make exclusion errors, then the results are simply uninterpretable. The only possible outcome is results that support unconscious perception. It is impossible to use the math of process dissociation to show that unconscious perception is not occurring. The predictions made by the simple math of the process dissociation approach are not testable because they simply cannot be refuted. As such, the process dissociation procedure approach to the study of unconscious perception lacks scientiWc merit.
We recently proposed a parsimonious explanation of exclusion failure eVects that does not require an unconscious mechanism (Fisk & Haase, in press ). Incorrect execution of the exclusion task, such as completing the stem with the target word, is a mistake. Exclusion tasks with stem completion responses are challenging tasks, so most participants will make some mistakes (Block, 2001) . For example, studies employing exclusion tasks often Wnd that some participants need to be removed from the data set for not following exclusion instructions (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Hutchison et al., 2004) , which suggests that the exclusion task is challenging. Furthermore, we would reasonably anticipate that mistakes will increase as task diYculty increases. Elevated exclusion failure can thus be viewed as an simple increase in mistakes that occurs when task diYculty is increased. For example, more exclusion errors are made at short target durations (e.g., 50 or 75 ms) than long target durations (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Fisk & Haase, in press; Merikle et al., 1995) . Short target durations make a diYcult exclusion task even harder to perform, thereby leading to increased mistakes on the exclusion task (i.e., exclusion failure). Since the baseline rate of exclusion errors is low to begin with (typically .10 to .25), only a modest increase in errors due to elevated task diYculty is needed to produce exclusion failure eVects. The interpretation of exclusion failure as elevated mistakes caused by a confound with task diYculty is also consistent with evidence that exclusion failure eVects can be abolished with increased incentives (Visser & Merikle, 1999) . In short, exclusion failure eVects may be the product of confounding various experimental manipulations with task diYculty. Additional constructs, like unconscious perception, are unnecessary to explain exclusion failure eVects.
The present evidence is consistent with the interpretation of exclusion failure eVects outlined above. The 2AFC exclusion task contained dissimilar targets and both choices were made available to the observers during the response. The participants had little diYculty in choosing the opposite of the target stimulus, resulting in exclusion success in all experiments. On the other hand, exclusion experiments with stem completion tasks as a dependent variable require participants to make responses that are highly similar to the target because all potential responses must share the Wrst three letters. The correlated nature of potential responses in stem completion tasks likely increases task diYculty, thereby leading to more mistakes on the exclusion task and greater exclusion failure eVects. The response options are also not available to participants who are performing a stem completion task, requiring the participants to draw potential responses from memory, likely over a period of many seconds, which could increase the chances of conscious perception followed by rapid forgetting (Holender & Duscherer, 2004 ). Based on these task diVerences, we would expect exclusion success to occur with a 2AFC exclusion task, but exclusion failure to be obtained with an exclusion stem-completion task. In essence, stem completion tasks produce elevated exclusion errors and exclusion failure eVects at short durations simply because these tasks are more diYcult to do than 2AFC exclusion.
Exclusion procedures appear to be gaining wider acceptance as a means for studying unconscious perception, with a recent increase in the number of studies employing this approach (Esterman et al., 2002; Fecteau et al., 2004; Hutchison et al., 2004; Matsumoto et al., 2005; Smith & Bulman-Fleming, 2004; Visser et al., 2005) . On the other hand, the number of studies questioning the validity of exclusion paradigms is also increasing (Bengson, 2005; Fisk & Haase, in press; Haase & Fisk, 2001; Snodgrass, 2002; Visser & Merikle, 1999) . We feel that the further use of exclusion tasks for studying unconscious perception is not warranted at the present time. The current evidence that exclusion failure represents unconscious perception is simply not compelling. By extension, the interpretation of exclusion failure as evidence of unconscious perception in other experimental paradigms or clinical populations lacks a solid foundation. More work needs to be done to deWnitively establish the validity of exclusion tasks and process dissociation procedures before these techniques should be widely accepted as an appropriate means for studying unconscious perception.
